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EMINENT DOMAIN-URBAN RENEWAL-BROADER PowERS To TAKE
PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC UsE-Defendant city instituted a comprehensive urban redevelopment plan under which condemnation and purchase of
blighted property1 would be followed by extensive demolition and clearance.
This land was then to be sold subject to certain use restrictions to private
developers, chiefly for light industry. Plaintiff, an owner of real estate
described as "improved and enhanced with . . . a good, sound, sanitary,
modem and well-kept building,"2 brought an action in a lower state court

l A "blighted area" is statutorily defined as an area marked by such conditions as
"excessive land coverage," "tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair
value of the land," and "improper subdivision or obsolete platting," as well as the
lack of sanitary facilities and presence of fire hazards commonly associated with slum
districts. WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 35.81.010(2) (Supp. 1961).
2 Principal case at 374, 378 P .2d 466.

1066

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

seeking a declaratory judgment against the constitutionality of the Washington Urban Renewal Law,8 and an injunction to prevent defendant city
from condemning his property under the statute. The owner contended
that resale to private persons would constitute use of the eminent domain
power for a private purpose. The trial court gave summary judgment for
the defendant city. On appeal, held, affirmed, by a five-to-four decision.
Condemnation, acquisition, and demolition by public authority of substandard or blighted areas of urban land is a public use justifying the
exercise of the eminent domain power, and subsequent resale of cleared
land to private persons is only incidental to the main, constitutionally
valid purpose. Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464
(1963).
Overwhelming pressure generated in this century by the slow physical
and social decay of the nation's great cities has forced courts to re-evaluate
traditional constitutional limitations upon the taking of private property
for public use. Local governments have long been aware of residential
and industrial slum problems, but not until passage of the Federal Housing
Act of 1949 4 were states financially able to initiate extensive slum clearance
and public housing programs. By 1958 all but eight states had passed
legislation permitting local governments to undertake federally assisted
urban renewal plans; 5 the principal case adds Washington to the list of
thirty-one states whose highest courts have upheld condemnation under
such urban renewal laws. 6 The Washington statute upheld in the principal
case is typical of the statutes found in many states. 7 After declaring the
necessity of removing blighted areas constituting a menace to public
health, safety, and morals, 8 the law gives municipalities authority to determine the existence of blighted areas,9 to draw up plans for redevelopment10
a WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 35.81.010-.910 (Supp. 1961).
4 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1451-60 (1958), providing for federal loans and
capital grants to cover up to two-thirds of the cost of housing and renewal projects.
For a history of federal statutory programs in public housing and urban renewal, see
Comment, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504 (1959).
5 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 507 n.29 (1959).
6 See cases cited in principal case at 393-95, 378 P.2d at 476-77. Three courts have ruled
to the contrary. The decision in Housing Authority v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d
891 (1~53), ruling against an urban renewal plan, was overruled by constitutional amendment, GA. CoNST. art. XVI. The Florida court severely limited an earlier decision against
renewal of a blighted area, Ada,ms v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952), by its
ruling upholding a slum clearance plan, Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, II5 So. 2d
745 (Fla. 1959). Only South Carolina, in Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d
280 (1956), is still firmly on record in opposition to urban renewal programs involving
resale to private owners.
7 E.g., CAL. HEALTH 8: SAFETY CODE §§ 33000-985; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67½, §§ 63-91
(Smith-Hurd 1959); M1cH. CoMP. LAws §§ 125.901-.922 (1948); N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN,
LAW §§ 200-21.
8 WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 35.81.020 (Supp. 1961).
9 WASH, REv. CoDE ANN.§ 35.81.050 (Supp. 1961).
10 No federal loans or capital grants are approved by the Federal Housing and Home
Finance Administrator until the authority requesting assistance presents "a workable
program for community improvement." 75 Stat. 153, 172 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 145l(c) (Supp.
IV, 1963).
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and to submit them to public hearings.11 The city may then proceed to
condemn land in the blighted area, and, once the land is cleared, dispose
of it to private developers. 12
The landowner in the principal case attacked the condemnation on
two major grounds. First, petitioner challenged the taking of his property,
which admittedly constituted no danger to public health or safety; second,
he charged that the "public use" requirement imposed on the exercise of
the eminent domain power prohibited resale of condemned land to private
interests. Although plans for redeveloping predominately slum or blighted
areas often include property not at all substandard, courts have uniformly
held that no relief can be given on that basis. This determination frequently
results from the considerable weight courts give to legislative decisions as
to the necessity for taking particular property; 13 in other cases, courts have
stated that the character of specific condemned property is defined by the
area as a whole, and that exemption of some properties from a scheme of
total area redevelopment would be impractical.14 Although the court in the
principal case adopted the latter point of view, it nevertheless seems exceedingly harsh to force an owner of well-kept land to relocate in the name of
slum clearance. The Federal Housing Act originally required that urban
renewal plans, in order to qualify for loans or grants, include provision
for relocation of displaced residents.lli Unfairness to owners of well-kept
land persisted, however, and was among the factors leading to the 1954
amendment to the act,16 which provided for federal loans, grants, and
WASH. REv. CODE .ANN.§ 35.81.060(3) (Supp. 1961).
WASH. REv. CODE .ANN. § 35.81.081 (Supp. 1961): "Condemnation for urban renewal
of blighted areas is declared to be a public use.••." Sale of condemned land to private
developers is conditioned by restrictions on the possible uses of the land. WASH. REv. CODE
.ANN. § 35.81.090(1) (Supp. 1961).
18 Housing &: Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn.
1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953);
Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950). In Kasken v. Impellitteri,
supra, the court upheld a planning agency's determination of slum conditions despite evidence that in the area condemned only 10% of the buildings were substandard, and only
2% could properly be considered "slum." In Bero Hall Corp. v. Impellitteri, 128 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct. 1954), the objecting landowner argued that since some properties within
the renewal area were not being condemned, it was discriminatory to take his. The court
yielded to the administrative decision in that case as well. A similar argument was posed
by the property owner in the principal case, but the majority did not deal with the
contention directly.
14 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954); Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321,
160 A.2d 745, 749 (1960); Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 37 Del. Ch. 202,
139 A.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Herzinger v. Mayor &: City Council, 203 Md. 49, 98 A.2d
87 (1953); Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment &: Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E.2d
893 (1953).
115 63 Stat. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1958), see Leach, The Federal Urban
Renewal Program: A Ten-Year Critique, 25 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 777, 788 (1960);
Millspaugh, Problems and Opportunities of Relocation, 26 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 6,
28-31 (1961).
16 68 Stat. 622 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-62 (1958). See also S. REP. No. 1472, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
11

12
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mortgage insurance to assist community-wide programs of neighborhood
conservation and rehabilitation.17 This amendment has caused a trend
toward plans designed to redevelop only specific slum or blighted properties,18 and it may help remedy the anomaly of dismantling sound structures
and housing as part of a sweeping program of renewal. Despite this trend,
owners of well-kept land, like the plaintiff in the principal case, will continue
to have their land condemned and taken from them. This result is probably
justifiable, however, for if some owners could exempt their land by proving
that it was not blighted, the door would be open to numerous spurious
claims which could frustrate slum clearance projects by tying them up in
the courts for years. The proper remedy for owners whose land does not
merit condemnation lies in an effective program of public hearings prior
to drawing up the final plan.19 By giving all interested parties an opportunity to question the planning body on the necessity of taking particular
property, individual rights can be given proper protection without sacrificing the community's need for expeditious urban renewal.
The plaintiffs second objection contested the power of the state to sell
condemned land to private developers; this contention bears directly
upon the usual constitutional provision that private property must not
be taken for public use without fair compensation.2 ° Courts for many years
felt bound by the view that "public use" meant "use by the public,"21 and
consequently viewed any resale of condemned property to private persons
with disfavor. The advent of the need for sweeping urban renewal made
many courts realize that it was impractical to require cities to retain title
to all the land which had to be condemned in order effectively to clear
slums, and the courts have consequently discarded this limited definition
of public use. One line of authority simply redefines "public use" in terms
of "public benefit,"22 thereby avoiding any requirement that the public
continue to own condemned property. Under this view, resale is held to
be only incidental to the main purpose of slum clearance.23 The translation
of "public use" into "public benefit" releases cities from the burden of
land ownership and the resulting diminution of the tax base. Another
17 Conservation and urban rehabilitation refer to plans designed to cure substandard
housing conditions without condemning and totally demolishing existing structures.
The cost of such programs is usually borne by both public and private sources. Rehabilitation should be distinguished from urban renewal, which contemplates using only
public capital in plans of condemnation and destruction of slums and blighted areas.
18 Comment, 72 HARv. L. R.Ev. 504, 505, 539 (1959).
19 Id. at 514, 551.
20 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CoNST. art. I, § 16, amend. 9.
21 E.g., Reed v. Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 213 Pac. 923 (1923); Neitzel v. Spokane Int'l
R.R., 65 Wash. 100, 117 Pac. 864 (1911); COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 766 (7th
ed. 1903). But see NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN§ 40 (2d ed. 1917).
22 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
23 Id. at 33-34; Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 37 Del. Ch. 202, l!l9
A.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Foeller v. Housing Authority, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P .2d 752 (1953);
Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E.2d 893
(1953).
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accepted theory, which upholds urban renewal resale plans while remaining
faithful to the old definition of public use, is that resale subject to restrictions which limit future utilization of land to publicly authorized purposes
is a public use because it constitutes continuing proprietorship by the
city.2 • Both of these theories were embraced by the court in the principal
case.211 These interpretations of public use have been almost unanimously
adopted by courts to overcome the constitutional objection to resale of
condemned land; 26 furthermore, the increased use of rehabilitation programs
may eventually eliminate whatever remains of the resale issue, as well as
the problem of condemning unblighted property. This trend toward rehabilitation is fostered in part by the difficulty of disposing of cleared land
subject to use restrictions. One study made in 1960 showed that cities had
resold less than one-third of the total acreage condemned.27
Most courts which have upheld the resale provisions of urban renewal
laws, however, have found a direct relationship between taking coupled
with resale and the traditional police power of the state to promote health,
safety, morals, and the general welfare. The principal case, when contrasted with the Washington court's earlier decision of Hogue v. Port of
Seattle,28 clearly delineates a probable area of future conflict in the law of
eminent domain. vVhile the principal case upheld an urban renewal plan
designed to eradicate slum conditions, the court distinguished this situation from that in the Hogue case, where the same statute was held unconstitutional when used to condemn fully-developed agricultural and residential
land for construction of port facilities and industrial sites. The court in
the Hogue case ruled that conditions such as "inappropriate or mixed uses
of land or buildings, ... faulty lot layout ... , defective or unusual conditions of title ... " 29 bore no relation to the maintenance of public health
or safety. Moreover, the plan for disposing of the land did not bear directly
upon public health or safety, but was designed merely to promote new
industry. Since neither the taking nor the disposition came within the
scope of the police power, the plan was consequently held an unjustified
use of the power of eminent domain. Other courts presented with similar
requests to extend the eminent domain power beyond the state police power
have given the same answers. 30
24 Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954); Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954).
211 The principal case in effect overruled previous cases cited note 21 supra, as well
as Matthews v. Belfast Mfg. Co., 35 Wash. 662, 77 Pac. 1046 (1904), and Healy Lumber
Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681 (1903).
26 See cases cited in principal case at 476-77.
.
27 Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal, 25 LAW 8e CONTEMP. PROB.
732, 740 (1960) (7,743 acres condemned, 2,368 acres resold).
28 54 Wash. 2d 799,341 P.2d 171 (1959).
20 Id. at 812,341 P.2d at 178-79.
30 Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 37 Del. Ch. 202, 139 A.2d 476 (Sup.
Ct. 1958); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957); Opinion of .the
Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955).
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The pattern of permissible use of eminent domain power outlined by
these courts involves a distinction between the taking of property and the
disposal of the same land by the condemning authority. Where the process
of taking is designed to serve a specific purpose traditionally within the
scope of the police power, such as eradication of slums, courts deem the
public use requirement satisfied and allow cities to dispose of the land as
they see fit. 31 On the other hand, where the taking serves no purpose within
the usual scope of the police power, courts will not permit disposal of the
acquired land to go beyond purposes traditionally related to the police power.32 The practical consequence of these rules is that cities must either
retain title to the property and use it for a strictly governmental operation,
or sell it to housing developers to alleviate a community-wide housing
problem, a kind of resale which the courts have considered a valid exercise
of the police power.33 It seems anomalous that courts have been willing
to apply the broad public benefit definition of public use to either takings
or dispositions but not to both; no court has yet given a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon. While use of the eminent domain power has
historically been closely tied to police power purposes, there presently
exist many pressing community needs which are only indirectly related to
public health and safety. A broad definition of public use in terms of public
benefit for both takings and dispositions has apparently been accepted
by some courts, notably the Supreme Court, 84 and this development may
foretell increasing judicial acceptance of a wider scope of purposes for
which governments will be allowed to wield the power to condemn. This
trend is evident in recent cases involving attempts to condemn land to
improve the aesthetic appearance of communities. 35 Furthermore, one
important state court ~as held that the presence of some "compelling economic need" is enough to warrant use of the power of eminent domain. 36
Just such a need was present in the Hogue case.
Although the burden of slum conditions and the need for new housing
stand out as among the most pressing problems faced by local governments,
many communities are also searching for ways to attract new and diversified
See note 26 supra.
Cases cited note 30 supra.
Provisions for federal assistance seem to recognize this pattern, since the Federal
Housing Act stipulates that an urban renewal program, in order to qualify for federal
grants, must involve either a removal of slum conditions or the construction of residential
housing upon condemned open land. Cities may, however, receive up to 10% of the
total amount of capital grants authorized by the act for renewal programs which meet
neither of these qualifications. 70 Stat. 1097 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1958).
34 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
164 U.S. 112, 161, 166 (1896). See also Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d
777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954); Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 III. 600, Ill N.E.2d 626
(1953); Atwood v. Willacy County Nav. Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
85 Housing&: Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn.
I, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960); Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (dictum).
36 Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777,266 P.2d 105 (1958).
31
32
33
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industry, or for means of improving the appearance of urban areas.37
Allowing governments to justify disposal of condemned land solely on
grounds of public benefit, while limiting takings to those justifiable under
the narrower terms of the police power, seems an illogical and inconsistent
interpretation of most state constitutions. Moreover, limiting either taking
or disposal to police power purposes denies to local governments a proper
means of meeting vital economic, social, and aesthetic needs. Critics of a
broad use of the condemnation power, including the dissenters in the
principal case, often charge that the government is telling landowners
that it knows better than they what is the best utilization of their property.38
Nevertheless, "no society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice
individual welfare to its own existence," 39 and governments have for years
told landowners in the path of a proposed highway that it knows better
than they what is the more proper use of their land. In the mid-twentieth
century the means of satisfying community-wide economic and social needs
are as vital to a city as was the construction of a highway connecting that
city with neighboring towns thirty years ago. Courts should broaden the
permissible use of the power of eminent domain and allow governments
to use the tools necessary for satisfying modern community needs.
Roger L. McManus

87 See Comment, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 730 (1955).
88 Comment, 23 .ALBANY L. REv. 386 (1959); Note, 34 TUL. L. R.Ev. 616 (1960);

!18 NoTRE DAME LAw. 210 (1963).
30 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (Howe ed. 1963). "Public policy sacrifices the individual to the public good." Id. at 41.

